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The Impact of the Community Development Projects on Assessing Urban
Deprivation
Timothy Whitton
Blaise Pascal University, Clermond-Ferrand
On 17 June 1994, the Independent ran the following headline: £10bn wasted on failed inner
city  policy.  The Government  is  castigated  for  having frittered  away public  money on an
endless  stream of  apparently useless  projects  aimed  at  improving the inner-city  situation.
These criticisms and the article's concluding recommendations are all too reminiscent of so
much of the literature devoted to "those Inner Cities" ever since the issue was brought to the
forefront of the political arena at the end of the 1960s.1
In 1986, Lord Scarman chaired a conference devoted to urban unrest during which many of
the  speakers  quite  openly  expressed  their  bitterness,  disappointment  and  exasperation  at
having to repeat yet again what they had been stating for years.2 Their "I told you so" attitude
bears witness to the ever-widening gap between what was needed to revive the inner-city
areas and what was actually being done. Their words fell once again on deaf ears.
My aim here is not to imitate the Independent and expound upon the alleged shortcomings of
government  spending in the field of inner cities.  Vast sums of money have perhaps been
wasted on trying to stamp out decay in some of Britain's most underprivileged urban areas,
but defining the problems to be solved has also generated a great deal of waste and frustration.
To highlight this I propose to take a step back in time to examine the first faltering steps of
the Urban Programme (UP) and more particularly one of its most important offspring, the
Community Development Projects (CDPs). The CDPs were established in 1969 and served as
a breeding-ground for inner-city policies to mature in,  but withered on the vine when the
enhanced Urban Programme was launched in 1977 following the government White Paper,
Policy for the Inner Cities.3 This document is often described as a watershed in government
commitment to inner cities policies and although it widely predicated upon the Inner Area
Studies, the CDPs played their part in informing the new approach.4 In this case, the money
engulfed by the CDPs was not  entirely wasted and although it  might  not  have served its
primary  purpose,  it  most  certainly  enabled  researchers  to  produce  substantial  empirical
material  concerning urban decay.  Whether  this  was put  to  (good) use or not,  there is  no
denying that the CDPs were milestones in the debate on the etiology of the inner-city crisis.
The Urban Programme announced on 5 May 1968 by the Prime Minister showed every sign
of having been plucked out of thin air.
It is as if the political [..] pressures to do something (and to be seen to be doing it) were
so great that something was done,  even in ignorance of what it  was hoped would be
achieved and how it would be accomplished.5
Whether Wilson's idea was to pave the way with good intentions or quell the fears aroused by
Enoch Powell's "Rivers of blood" speech, remains something of a mystery.6 If the Labour
Government was galvanised into action by Powell's diatribe then the ostensible link between
the UP and immigration highlights the shortcomings in their immigration policy. Whichever
the case may be, by responding so quickly to Powell, Wilson unfortunately established an
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intractable link between urban deprivation and immigration thus dealing a blow to inner city
policy from which it was never really to recover.
Clearly immigration had become a very high-profile issue especially in the wake of the racial
disturbances  which  had  shaken  America.  A  decade  earlier,  Britain  had  actually  felt  the
consequences of the 1952 McCarran-Walter Act restricting West Indian immigration into the
United States. This had led more or less directly to a sharp increase in the movement of an
unskilled immigrant population into the low-wage sector of the British economy. Over time
this exacerbated racial tension in Britain especially in areas like the inner cities where the
worst-off tended to congregate. In 1958 Britain was to have her fair share of racial unrest
culminating in the Nottingham and Notting Hill riots. The seat won in Smethwick in 1964
after an overtly racialist  local campaign stands out as a sad reminder of the vote-catching
potential  of  the  (anti-)  immigration  issue  especially  in  the  wake  of  the  contested  1962
Commonwealth Immigration Act.7
Wilson's plans for urban revival may appear therefore as a rather  ad hoc decision to keep
social  peace  within  Britain  by  steering  clear  of  the  American  nightmare.  To  counter
Powellism,  the  impact  of  immigration  on the  inner  city  crisis  in  Britain  was deliberately
played down.8
I then announced the UP […] to provide further help in housing, education and health in
a  number  of  big  towns  and  cities  where  these  problems  were  greatest  whether
immigration was a factor there or not.9 (emphasis added)
Furthermore, in announcing UP Wilson borrowed numerous ideas from President Johnson's
programme designed to combat  poverty in  America.  Both  adopted  a  blanket  approach in
dealing with urban deprivation which in time was contested as being ineffective, costly and
time-consuming. Whether Wilson's intention in proposing a comprehensive set of measures
was  to  gloss  over  his  Government's  distinct  lack  of  a  positive  immigration  policy,  is
questionable. The blanket approach was in any case later replaced by a much more selective
distribution of finance (often referred to as "positive discrimination") especially as funding
possibilities  gradually  dwindled.10 This  in  turn  merged  into  the  contemporary  and  more
fashionable "enterprise culture" approach.
Even  if  the  Urban  Programme  at  the  outset  lacked  any  solid  ideological  foundations  or
established  direction,  promises  of  financial  investment  in  urban  revival  were  abundant.
Despite the slightly chimerical nature of the programme, it was to dispose of £20-25m over
the first four years with the Local Government Act 1969 providing the legislative framework.
In 1970, the life of UP was extended from four to eight years and expenditure of £40m over
and above the initial f 20m was approved. A further £10m was added in 1971 and in 1972
£1.1m  specifically  for  projects  promoted  by  voluntary  organisations.  An  extra  f2m  was
allotted to UP in 1973 and again in 1974.
At the beginning UP was not  financed through the Rate Support  Grant,  for  according to
central government it needed to retain its financial specificity. This meant essentially that not
only were Local Authorities prevented from redirecting UP project funds - should they have
so wished  - but also that central government could interfere in local money matters.11 This
interference reinforced the traditional hostility between the public authorities, especially when
selectivity  in  allocating  grants  reflected  political  persuasions  rather  than  the  validity  of
proposed projects, to the detriment of actual project work.
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The  first  step  was  to  distribute  Urban  Aid  to  selected  areas  in  order  to  provide  capital
injection  for  a  plethora  of  projects  proposed  by  Local  Authorities  and  voluntary
organisations.12 In  areas  where  projects  were  approved  by  the  Home  Office  which  had
assumed a co-ordinating role, 75% grants were provided to Local  Authorities  on a yearly
approval basis. The remaining 25% had to be met from the Local Government budget, the aim
being to  secure some form of  co-operation and involvement  from local  authorities.  From
1968-1975,  around  3,750  projects  costing  nearly  £35m  gained  official  approval.  They
included provision for children, young people, the elderly and the homeless in the form of
organised facilities and activities, a variety of advice, education and community centres and
general social work devoted chiefly to welfare and health.13 By far the greatest number of
approved projects dealt with nursery education.
The final criteria by which Local Authorities were able to apply for Urban Programme project
funding were: i) the proportion of immigrant children on the school roll and ii) the proportion
of  households  in  an  authority  having  more  then  one  and  a  half  persons  per  room.  The
bluntness  of  this  approach  betrays  Ministers'  desire  to  get  the  Urban programme  off  the
ground hoping probably that once the ball was rolling, it would pick up speed due to its own
interior dynamics.
At the same time 12 Community Development Projects  were sanctioned under UP in the
following localities:
Local Authority Project Area
Coventry Hillfields
Liverpool Vauxhall
Southwark Newington
Glamorgan Glyncorrwg
Newhaven Canning Town
West Riding Batley
Paisley Ferguslie Park
Newcastle Benwell
Cumberland Cleator Moor, Arlecdon, Frizington
Birmingham Saltley
Tynemouth Percy, Trinity
Oldham Clarksfield
At  the  outset  they  were  administered  by  officials  from  the  Home  Office’s  Children’s
Department, responsibility for which was transferred to the Department of Health and Social
Security  following  the  reorganisation  of  Central  Government  departments  after  the  1970
General Election. Each CDP was closely followed by a research team, often university based,
whose task it was to monitor activities and establish documented reports. Local CDPs related
to the Home Office through a regular CDP Consultative Council.
James  Callaghan,  who  in  1969  was  Home  Secretary,  declared  that  the  CDPs  were  "a
neighbourhood-based experiment aimed at finding new ways of meeting the needs of people
living in areas of high social deprivation." Whereas the numerous projects funded under UP
were  designed  to  target  specific  situations  in  specific  localities,  the  CDPs  dealt  with
community issues in small areas of between 10,000-40,000 people thus providing an average
view of urban deprivation.
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The purpose of the CDP may be summarised as: to improve the quality of individual,
family and community life in areas with high levels of social need.14
In some cases therefore, CDPs would unavoidably cut across areas which had already been
singled  out  for  special  treatment  from the  Local  Authorities.  These  included  areas  with
Community Industry Schemes, Special Development or Intermediate Areas (qualifying thus
for industrial incentives), Educational Priority Areas and General Improvement Areas, to state
just a few.
As with the American Poverty Programme CDP fieldwork consisted in the organisation or
reorganisation of the distribution of social services. The aim of the projects was to:
[..] try to find out how to give more effective help to people suffering from severe personal
and social deprivation [..] [and] try to reduce the dependence of such families on difficult
and costly forms of help, such as the removal of children into care, psychiatric treatment
or prolonged dependence on supplementary benefit, and find ways of helping them to live
fuller and more satisfying lives.15
In other words CDPs were not just another source of direct funding in the form of social
provision to recipients, for their aim was to use resources in a targeted and better manner.
They were one more response to urban deprivation in areas which had not benefited from the
sort of well-being fostered by the Welfare State.
CDP action can be divided into six categories:  employment,  income maintenance,  welfare
rights,  housing,  education,  information  and  advice,  and  finally  research.  Each  project
developed a policy strategy which in turn embraced a neighbourhood strategy corresponding
to the more particular needs of the area covered.
Unlike the numerous specific local projects funded under the Urban Programme, the CDPs
stand  out  as  being  the  research  arm  of  urban  renewal  policy.  Direct  contact  with  local
residents covered the following range of social work: encourage take-up of available benefits;
provide  information,  advocacy  and  technical  support  particularly  in  the  field  of  housing
(leases, improvement schemes), (un-) employment, retirement and pensions; establish special
educational provision especially for the underprivileged and at nursery level and to exploit
local employment potential. Filling in gaps in the local social services was of course the more
visible  side  to  the  CDPs.16 Nonetheless,  a  great  deal  of  their  work  involved  the  study,
monitoring or investigation of local social provision. In many instances, especially at a policy
strategy level, research was the main result of the CDPs' missions as they endeavoured to give
some sort of meaning to the Urban programme.
Defining urban deprivation
Such was Wilson's haste to respond to the fears raised by Powell, and such, it is surely fair to
add, was the confusion surrounding immigration and race relations  policy,  that  very little
groundwork had been done before announcing the Urban Programme to actually state why it
was necessary to deal with urban deprivation. Perhaps things were so self-evident that Wilson
hoped  that  they  would  just  fall  into  place  naturally.  This  was  the  first  trap,  for  the
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self-evidences of the time were mainly based on simple social pathological assumptions that
went unchallenged.
It was assumed that problems of urban deprivation had their origins in the characteristics
of local populations  -  in individual pathologies  -  and these would best be resolved by
better field co-ordination of the personal social services, combined with the mobilisation
of self-help and mutual aid in the community even among those who experience most
difficulty in standing on their own feet.17
Without going to the same extremes as Powell, popular belief readily subscribed to the view
that the inner cities suffered from the weaknesses of those who lived there. The link between
this idea and the immigration issue was even simpler: since immigrants tended to live in areas
of urban decay, they were responsible for this state of affairs (the 1958 riots had of course
confirmed this and given stronger impetus to the social pathological view).
[...] the forced concentration of immigrants in the deprived and decaying areas of the big
cities highlighted (and reinforced) existing social deprivation; racism defined them as its
cause.18
In order therefore to improve the inner-city situation, something had to be done to curb the
pernicious  effects  of  immigration  and  of  immigrants  themselves.  Wilson  inadvertently
reiterated this view in May 1968 when he announced the Urban Programme by emphasising
how immigration tended to exacerbate the inner-city problem (whatever that was!), or brought
it out into the open. Edwards and Batley put it in a nutshell.
UP  was  concerned  with  a  programme  to  deal  with  the  problems  experienced  by
immigrants and at the same time a way of relieving the stress caused by immigration.19
This had become so widely accepted and axiomatic that on the whole more political effort
was being devoted to the immigration issue than to relieving the plight of the inner cities. It
was a case of the trees hiding the wood for the areas designated as being deprived were more
often  than  not  quite  simply  those  with  high  concentrations  of  coloured  people.  This  is
reflected in the way in which UP officials established their hierarchical list of deprivation
factors  which  ran  as  follows  in  order  of  importance:  immigrant  concentrations/language
difficulties, poverty or low income, problems of handicapped, lack of community facilities,
unemployment/poor  industrial  base/poor  job  opportunities,  single-parent  families,
overcrowding,  urban  renewal  problems,  declining  industry,  declining  rate  of  income,
decaying  infrastructure,  large  families,  poor  health,  level  of  crime,  bad  housing,
non-involvement in local affairs and local politics. Immigration and poverty were of course
high on the agenda.
This  rather  short-sighted  view of  the  inner-city  crisis  overlooked  official  CDP and other
research that pointed to the far wider reaching causes and consequences of urban decay. In
1967, the Plowden Report had drawn up a list of criteria in order to help define the urban
crisis in terms of multiple deprivation which quite naturally covered the immigration issue.20
These  included occupation,  size  of  families,  supplements  in  cash or  kind from the  State,
overcrowding and sharing of houses, poor attendance and truancy from school, proportion of
retarded, disturbed or handicapped pupils, incomplete families and children unable to speak
English. The strength behind this sort of approach lay in its ability to include the immigration
issue  without  drawing  particular  attention  to  it  by  concocting  a  clumsy  hierarchy  of
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deprivations. Emphasis was laid on the hardships that immigrants experienced along with the
white population in the same area, rather than those they supposedly caused. In this way the
whole population of a given area was concerned, white and coloured people alike. Despite the
fact  that  urban deprivation  had only been partially  defined and what  is  more  using  only
sample manifestations, or indicators, people were related to it rather than it to people's - and
especially immigrants'- so-called social inadequacies.
CDP officials  drew up  their  own list  of  criteria  which,  although  similar  to  those  of  the
Plowden Report, alluded to the "deprivation cycle" and the sort of vicious circle that deprived
families could be trapped in:
[...]  ill-health  -  financial  difficulties  -  children  suffering  from deprivation  -  constant
delinquency  -  inability  of  the  children  to  adjust  to  adult  life  -  unstable  marriages  -
emotional problems, ill-health and the cycle begins again.21
The  problem of  any  reference  to  a  cyclical  rationalisation  of  urban  deprivation  was  the
tendency, for want of a way of breaking the vicious circle, to simply lay the blame upon the
inner-city population. They were caught up in the supposedly unending cycle that generated
the  social  inadequacies  which  were  responsible  for  (their)  urban  degeneration.  The  CDP
analysis was slightly different insofar as it insisted on the interdependency of factors which
led  to  average  deprivation:  an  area  deprived in  one  field  probably suffered  from general
deprivation. In so doing the CDPs challenged the widespread belief that breaking the vicious
circle would have an impact on deprived communities. They went even further by saying that
fundamental urban deprivation was not necessarily contained within the boundaries of the
inner-city areas. In this respect focusing efforts on a few limited areas could not alter the
harmful overall effects of market forces.
Analysis of the wider context of CDP areas has led us to recognise what many social
scientists have been asserting in recent years: that problems of multideprivation have to
be  re-defined  and  reinterpreted  in  terms  of  structural  constraints  rather  than
psychological motivations, external rather than internal factors.22
This conception had far, wider-reaching roots which went beyond the media-friendly scope of
the UP projects and demanded the restructuring of the national economy.
The Urban Programme moves on
Even  though  UP was  not  inundated  with  requests  from Local  Authorities  and  voluntary
organisations,  submissions  for  project  approval  far  outnumbered  funding  possibilities.
Whatever impression of grandeur UP may leave, it accounted for only a very small portion of
total money allocated to the social services.23
Apart from the quite pragmatic problem raised by monetary issues, UP still lacked any sense
of direction despite the growing and constantly updated body of empirical evidence provided
by the CDPs on the real needs of deprived areas. Before this research took form though (and,
to be truthful, well after it!), UP appeared to rely on a rather makeshift and botched strategy.
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For all the coherence implied by the word "programme”, and for all the unity implied by
the  joint  issue  of  circulars  and  approvals,  we  see  that  central  government
decision-making in the UP was diffused and fragmented.24
On 6 April 1972, en editorial in  The Times echoed these criticisms but also challenged the
effectiveness of UP. People quite simply could not fathom out what it was supposed to be
achieving:
There is a growing awareness that Britain's worst social conditions are to be found in the
decaying  centres  of  our  cities.  But  there  is  as  yet  no  official  policy  to  match  that
awareness […]. Their urban programme is a ragbag of good intentions. It does a certain
amount  of  good  in  a  haphazard  way.  It  has  stimulated  some  good  ideas.  But  it  is
inadequate in scope, and has not managed to bring about a proper urban strategy at local
level. All too often the urban programme is regarded by local officials simply as a source
of finance for programmes for which they would otherwise not be able to find the money.
Its effects are therefore uncoordinated.
Even so, the fundamental etiological debate was somehow just getting off the ground and the
CDP research teams were beginning to make waves.
Subsequent to the shift in thinking within the [Urban Deprivation] Unit, or concurrent with it,
has been the move away from viewing deprivation in pathological terms to a conception that
takes more account of basic inequalities in the distribution of goods and services.25
However, by admitting their own deficiencies and openly challenging the widely accepted
social  pathological  approach to  urban deprivation  the  CDPs were threatening  mainstream
political thinking.
Clearly  a local  CDP on its  own is  not  in  a position to  tackle  the  ultimate  causes  of
disadvantage which have their  sources nationally  in the economy, and in government
policy.26
The CDPs spent a long time in fact defining what they had not achieved. This betrayed their
frustration both at their inability to make significant inroads into government thinking and the
latter's reluctance to lend any credibility or support to CDP findings.
The  'crisis'  itself  has  never  been  satisfactorily  defined  and  even  where  government
statements  have  appeared  to  indicate  a  particular  view  of  the  crisis,  this  has  not
necessarily been supported by the policy measures taken.27
As long as governments refused to accept that urban decay was a direr consequence of the
capitalist  market's  structural  inequality,  then  the  CDP  work  was  bound  to  go  unheeded.
Because the CDPs constantly asserted that deprivation was due to external factors and not
people, they could deal only with cosmetic solutions to the plight of the inner cities, and their
role as a placebo reinforced their conviction that UP was a sham.28 While project rhetoric
served only to mask the lack of impact of the CDPs on the community at large, the only way
out from their obvious ineffectiveness was to insist on a continually better and more efficient
use of  available  resources  - especially  as  they had no funds to  inject  directly  into social
provision. To this end they were constantly forced to deal with the obvious causes of urban
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deprivation simply because this was so much easier and more acceptable than delving into its
far-reaching consequences.
Towards the enterprise culture
CDPs turned out to be an experiment in order to establish a plan rather than a solution in
themselves.  Even as late as 1974, five years  after  the launching of the CDPs, the lack of
tangible results within deprived areas was apparent:
The majority of CDPs are still at an early stage. But it is already possible to draw from
their  work  so  far  some  idea  of  the  areas  where  the  experiment  can  be  expected  to
contribute to drawing up a programme directed towards solving the problem of urban
deprivation.29
This criticism was to be repeated again and again as each attempt to tackle urban deprivation
rang very hollow:
Experiments are now an established tradition in the inner city as a substitute for actually
spending the money required to deal with these problems.30
The visible impact of UP on targeted communities had moreover been very unsatisfactory.
New restrictions on public spending meant that funding for UP projects was scarcer and the
so-called "enhanced" Urban Programme announced in 1977 was a logical  shift  towards a
more money minded approach in dealing with urban deprivation. Free market policies had
been creeping steadily in to UP and private enterprise had already been involved in numerous
projects, albeit perhaps for more practical rather than ideological motivations.
[...]  and  the  government  requested  submissions  under  the  Urban  Aid  Programme  to  be
concerned  with  projects  which  would  assist  in  wealth  creation  rather  than  consumption,
engage the private sector and contribute to making the inner cities places where people want
to live and work.31
CDPs had not mustered enough political clout to check the move towards seeking an overall
solution to the inner-city crisis somewhere within the private sector. From 1977 onwards, the
old style of partnerships between local and central government was to be supplanted by the
introduction of a new set of schemes involving the close participation of the private sector.
The regeneration of the inner cities is not, however, a job for central or local government
alone. A new and closer form of collaboration is required between government and the
private sector, between government and the community […] and above all with the people
living in the inner areas. It is their welfare, immediate and longer term, which must be the
ultimate touchstone for success.32
This was to seal the fate of the Community Development Projects since urban regeneration
was now to depend to a great extent on market development projects, where wealth could so
easily replace welfare.
By 1978, CDP had virtually  died out.  It  had been meant  to  shore up social  provision in
underprivileged  areas  whilst  providing  Government  with  a  continuous  flow  of  research.
However politicians grew weary of the CDP’s radical recommendations which did not fit in
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with general policies. The CDPs claimed that urban deprivation went beyond the inner-city
communities and could only be tackled by redistributive policies designed to even out wealth
over the regions. By constantly stating their belief that the organisation of capital was the key
issue  and  not  red-flag  elements  such  as  immigration  or  poverty,  the  CDPs  estranged
themselves  somewhat  from their  political  partners.  This  cut  short  the  possibility  of  their
strategic efforts in the community being backed up by a wider initiative on a national scale
designed to stamp out the ultimate causes of urban deprivation. At the same time, it gained
them the reputation of being more radical than other UP projects, which meant that the latter -
however ineffective - were more acceptable to government.
Judging by the amounts of money spent on trying to deal with urban deprivation and the
consequent  inner-city  crisis,  one  may  wonder  which  comes  first,  the  welfare  of  the
community living in the under-privileged areas or that of the management that deals with
them. Had more time been spent in the early stages in looking beyond the mere indicators of
urban deprivation and coming to terms with the underlying causes, then surely waste could
have been minimal. Ultimately the CDPs were a thorn in the government's side because they
constantly pointed out the necessity for major structural changes in society, which was the
only realistic strategy capable of eradicating urban deprivation. What better way of refuting
this sort of challenge than handing it over to the marker: but therein lies another tale.
Monica CHARLOT (general editor), Britain’s Inner Cities, Paris: Ophrys – Ploton, 1994, pp.
9-23.
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